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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ELECTIONS - EQUAL
PROTECTION
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
While traditionally two political parties have dominated Amer-
ican Presidential elections, there has frequently been a third-party
candidate who, although never successful, has often provided color
and dignity to an otherwise overbearing ritual. A primary reason
for an independent party's lack of success has been its inability to
comply with the rigid requirements of diverse state election laws.
Usually, state statutes permit voters to write in a party or candidate's
name only if that party or candidate has fulfilled certain conditions;
moreover, in order to secure a printed position on the ballot, the
same party or candidate must comply with more rigid statutory
requirements. The recent effort of George Wallace to qualify for
a printed ballot position in all 50 states precipitated a unique Su-
preme Court opinion. Ostensibly Williams v. Rhodes' dealt with
the power of a state to limit access to the ballot in a Presidential
election, yet the impact generated by the decision may be felt more
in a state's attempt to delimit state and local candidacy.
In Williams, the Ohio American Independent Party (OAIP),
joined by the Socialist Labor Party (SLP),2 alleged that Ohio's elec-
tion scheme effectively prohibited an independent Presidential can-
didate from gaining a place on the general election ballot in viola-
tion of the first and 14th amendments. Both appellants contended
that the onerous conditions precedent to securing a printed ballot po-
sition were violative of the equal protection clause of the 14th
amendment since they forced old and new political parties to com-
ply with disproportionate conditions. Specifically, the Ohio law re-
quired a new political party to present a petition signed by quali-
fied voters totaling 15 percent of the aggregate votes cast in the
preceding gubernatorial election, while a party already positioned
on the ballot was required to garner only 10 percent of the vote
'393 U.S. 23 (1968).
2 While procedurally the case involved two independent third party appellants, it
was essential for the Court to merge the two actions in order to secure a complete ad-
judication of all basic issues. Since the Ohio American Party had obtained the required
number of signatures, but had failed to file the petition before the prescribed filing
date, it had standing only to challenge section 3513.263 of the Ohio Revised Code,
which requires that a nominating petition be submitted 90 days before the election.
However, the Socialist Labor Party, having failed to comply with either the signature or
filing date requirement, had standing to raise the constitutionality of the signature re-
quirement as well as the filing date requirement.
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cast in the same election to preserve its position.' Conceding that the
state had the constitutional authority to reasonably regulate a can-
didate's placement on the ballot, the independent parties asserted
that the disparate classification violated their right to associate
freely for the advancement of political belief, and conclusively de-
prived a qualified voter the right to effectively cast his ballot. Ohio
maintained that article II section 1 of the United States Constitu-
tion expressly provided the state legislature with discretion to de-
termine the manner in which Presidential electors are to be selec-
ted, and that if the 14th amendment did restrict the legislature's dis-
cretion, the challenged statutory classification was reasonable in
light of such legitimate legislative objectives as promoting the two-
party system and encouraging the election of candidates by a ma-
jority.4 Read literally, article II section 1 gives the states absolute
discretion to decide how Presidential electors shall be chosen.5
3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.01 (Page 1960), which provides in part:
A-political party within the meaning of Title XXXV of the Revised Code
is any group of voters which, at the last preceding regular state election, polled
for its candidate for governor in the state at least ten percent of the entire
vote cast for governor or which filed with the secretary of state at least ninety
days before an election a petition signed by qualified electors equal in num-
ber to at least fifteen percent of the total vote for governor at the last preced-
ing election, declaring their intention of organizing a political party, the name
of which shall be stated in the declaration, and of participating in the next
succeeding election.
In 1966, 2,887,331 votes were cast for Ohio gubernatorial candidates. 1968 OHIO
ALMANAC 281 (1967). To hedge against the possibility that some signatures might
be disqualiied, the OAIP filed petitions supported by 450,000 signatures, well over
the 15 percent needed.
4 393 U.S. at 31-32. Undoubtedly the exclusion of minority parties from the ballot
can be justified by the fundamental policy frequently proffered by political scientists
that a two-party system, in contrast to a multiparty system, is characteristic of the most
sophisticated forms of political democracy, and is probably the only pattern within which
democracy can effectively operate. See H. LASKI, A GRAMMER OF POLITICS 314 (2d
ed. 1929); 1 A. LOWELL, THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND 458 (3d ed. 1912). How-
ever, the claim that new political parties would seriously jeopardize our inveterate two-
party system seems particularly conjectural in light of two hundred years of Anglo-
American history amply demonstrating the uncanny ability of our political system to
return always to the two-party system despite complete liberty of entry for new parties.
Moreover, while the British Labor Party'and the Republican Party in this country are
living examples of successful third party movements, it is difficult to find any theoretical
objection to such a result. Cf. 1 M. LERNER, AMERICA As A CrvILIZATION 396
(1957).
The rationale offered by Ohio is also pretentious in assuming that the primary role
of a minority party is to compete with the established political parties for the emolu-
ments of political power. Traditionally, the role of the third party has been to engender
new ideas which are assimilated and effectuated by the established political parties. W.
BINKLEY, AMERIcAN POLITICAL PARTIES 81 (1943). Today this contribution is es-
sential since the established parties tend to be cross-sectional with only slight deviations
in platform content See generally D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 281
(1951).
5 "Each State shall appoint, in such a Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,
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However, both the district court and the Supreme Court conceded
that this apparent unrestricted grant of constitutional power6 was
limited by other provisions of the Constitution.
After conceding that the Ohio election scheme violated the
equal protection clause, a majority of the three-judge district courte
held that both appellants were only entitled to write-in space on the
forthcoming ballot since their respective parties had been guilty of
laches and since the Supreme Court had failed to pronounce a suf-
ficient equity standard that would empower the district court to or-
der -the state to provide printed ballot space.8 Believing the view
of the majority to be myopic, the dissent maintained that the prin-
ciples articulated in the reapportionment and desegregation cases
compelled the court, acting in equity, to expressly place 'the OAIP
on the ballot.
On appeal, the Supreme Court faced the basic question of
whether the express grant of constitutional power contained in ar-
ticle II was circumscribed by the command of the 14th amendment.
In a 6-to-3 decision consisting of five separate opinions, all mem-
bers of the Court agreed that the 14th amendment confined the leg-
islature's discretionary power, but failed to agree as to whether
Ohio's statutory scheme represented a misuse of such restricted dis-
cretion.
Writing for the majority,'0 Justice Black asserted that the ex-
press grant of power in article II section 1 "may not be exercised in
a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution,""
and determined that the qualified voter's interest in casting a ballot
for a person of his choice is subsumed in the right to vote and in
the first amendment right to association. 2 The majority opinion,
a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress .... " U.S. CONST. article II § 1. But
see note 15 infra which suggests that the second sentence of section two of the 14th
amendment provides an alternative remedy for state deprivation of voting rights.
6 An interesting anomaly is presented by the concept that an article of the Constitu-
tion expressly gives the states power, particularly in light of the "reserved powers"
clause in the 10th amendment.
7 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1964).
8 Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 290 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
Id. at 997 (dissenting opinion).
10 Justices Brennan, Fortas, and Marshall were in complete concurrence with Justice
Black's opinion. Justice Stewart joined them concurring in the disposition of the SLP's
claim, but dissented from the disposition of the OAIP's claim.
11393 U.S. at 29.
12 Justice Black's position appears to be consistent with past opinions since the right
to be protected in this case is not an expressed first amendment right but rather a right
founded upon or ancillary to specific first amendment rights. Justice Black, like Justice
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relying on cases involving first amendment rights indicates that
when fundamental rights are involved, the state -has the burden of
showing a compelling interest13 for any interference with the ex-
ercise of such highly protected rights. Since the -interest of the in-
dividual voter is superior when balanced against the state's interest
in promoting political stability, Justice Black concluded that the
disproportionate treatment accorded old and new political parties
in securing a printed ballot position amounted to "invidious dis-
crimination." 14  Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, adopted a similar
balancing approach and found that since the discriminatory classi-
Douglas, has maintained that pure first amendment rights are absolute and that the
state can never show an interest which would justify the inhibition of these fundamental
rights. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
In Williams, Justice Black finds that the two concepts underlying the right of a can-
didate to free ballot access are the right of free association and the right to vote. While
Justice Black has indicated that freedom of association is an expressed absolute first
amendment right, see United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217 (1967),
he dearly stated in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Electors, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (dissent-
ing opinion), that: "There is no.. . specific constitutional provision absolutely barring
the states from abridging the right to vote." Id. at 675 nA. He concluded that the
state could place restrictions on an unqualified voter provided it could show a reasonable
basis for such restriction. In Williams Justice Black takes a further step in saying
that the state is required to show a compelling reason for any interference with the rights
of qualified voters. While both Harper and Williams are based on the equal protection
clause, together they require the application of different standards of state justification
depending upon whether the state is attempting to interfere with rights of a qualified
or unqualified voter. Such a use of the equal protection clause, with its varying stand-
ard of the burden of proof placed upon the state, may be leaving to the trial judge the
same excessive amount of discretion that Justice Black criticized when he castigated the
Harper majority for its attempt to discover what rights were fundamentally fair. See
Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substative Due Process of Law, 53
N.W.U.L. REV. 226 (1968). In the final analysis, since the Williams case concerns
one right which Justice Black considers to be expressly protected by the first amendment
and a second right which, while not expressly protected, is implicitly guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, he is compelled to adopt a balancing approach. However, included
within the balance is a severe burden of proof which is placed upon the state. See note
14 infra.
13 393 U.S. at 31. Ohio contended that a state could validly promote the two-party
system, and that appellants were not denied an opportunity to nominate a candidate of
their choice since they could participate in the general elections and vote against the
Democratic or Republican candidate. While not passing on the merits of the asserted
state interest, Justice Black stated that Ohio's election system as constituted could not
accomplish the alleged goals of the state since the candidates are identified only im-
mediately before the election, thus providing the disaffected voters inadequate time to
mobilize a campaign against such a candidate. Id. at 33.
14 d. at 34. Compare Justice Black's use of the term "invidious discrimination"
with his language in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966):
[S] tate laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause so long as these
distinctions and discriminations are not "irrational," "irrelevant," "unrea-
sonable," "arbitrary," or "invidious." These vague and indefinite terms do
not, of course, provide a precise formula or automatic mechanism for deciding
cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause. The restrictive connotations
of these terms ... are a plain recognition of the fact that under a proper in-
terpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, states are to have the broadest kind
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fication created by the Ohio law was unreasonable in light of the
alleged state objectives, -the statutory scheme violated the due proc-
ess clause.15 Finally, Justice Douglas, acceding to the general anal-
ysis of the majority, maintained that the first amendment rights of
voters are absolutely protected from any state interference.'
The two separate dissenting opinions focused on tangential is-
sues, and failed to conclusively controvert the balancing approach
utilized by the majority. After initially arguing that since, under
article II section 1, a state legislature could exclusively select only
Republican or Democratic electors, and was thus authorized to give
the voters of the state the same restricted choice, Justice Stewart
eventually adopted the balancing approach. However, he would
uphold the Ohio election scheme since it did not rest on grounds
wholly "irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objectives.""
Chief Justice Warren, fearing the consequences of a hurried de-
cision on such a weighty matter, would have dismissed the appeal
on the ground that the extraordinary equity relief sought should
only be granted upon a finding that the lower court's failure to
grant the 'requested relief amounted to an abuse of discretion. More-
of leeway in areas where they have general constitutional competence to act.
Id. at 673-74.
15 Mr. Justice Harlan's concurrence is interesting in view of his stated position in
the reapportionment cases. See Lucas v. Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964);
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964). As expressed in those cases Justice Harlan
believes that section two of the 14th amendment was intended by the 39th Congress to
permit a state to abridge a citizen's right to vote in any manner not prohibited by the
15th, 19th, or 24th amendments. Moreover, if a state does so abridge the right to vote,
the exclusive remedy, as expressly provided in section two, is that the state's basis of
representation in the House of Representatives, and in the Electoral College shall be
reduced. While the majority of the Court failed to address themselves to Justice Har-
lan's interpretation, several articles have raised serious doubts as to the accuracy of his
construction. See generally Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The Right to
Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-ninth Congress in THE SuPREME COURT
REVIEW 1965 at 33 (1965). Cf. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Franz,
Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73
YALE LJ. 1353 (1964); Graham, Oar "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN.
L. REV. 3 (1954). In Williams, Justice Harlan relies on the due process clause since
the first amendment right to associate freely is involved, 393 U.S. at 41. See generally
Justice Harlan's dissent in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965).
16 justice Douglas buttressed his position by referring to a prior pronouncement by
Justice Black in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissent-
ing). 393 U.S. at 39-40. Thus, Justice Douglas would protect access to the ballot as
part of the first amendment freedom of speech, a position he came close to adopting
in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Education, 383 U.S. 663 (1965). But see Justice Black's
dissenting opinion. Id. at 775.
17 393 U.S. at 53. Justice Stewart criticizes the majority for its use of the stringent
invidious discrimination standard, alleging that its utilization reflects an intense per-
sonal dislike for the motives of the state, rather than a true constitutional violation.
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over, in view of the High Court's deference to the lower courts in
the voting rights and reapportionment cases, there could be no
finding that the district court abused its discretion in failing to or-
der the candidates' names printed on the ballot.'8
The existence of five separate opinions is deceptive. With the
exception of Justice Douglas, eight members of the court acknowl-
edged the proposition that a state may, upon proper justification,
condition a candidate's access to the ballot. The majority and dis-
senting opinions principally differ over the quantum of justifica-
tion a state should be obliged to show before legitimately inter-
fering with the acknowledged interest of a qualified voter in
having several candidates from which to select. Theorizing that
the voter's interest is derived from first amendment rights, the ma-
jority would require the state to display compelling reasons for in-
hibiting such protected interest. Justices Harlan and Stewart, du-
bious of the analogy to expressed first amendment rights, would
require a less stringent degree of justification by the state. The
general proposition that the 14th amendment requires a state to
demonstrate a compelling interest before conditioning a party's ac-
cess to the ballot is significant because of the analytical and practi-
cal implications that it suggests.
Foremost, the Williams court conclusively deracinates the con-
Is Chief Justice Warren raises several complex questions. The Court in the reap-
portionment cases deferred the shaping of remedies to the district courts, which, in turn,
permitted the state legislatures to reach their own political solutions. Assuming for
the moment that the rights to be protected are the same in this situation, the Court in
the reapportionment cases always had several months before an election to facilitate po-
litical compromise. While Chief Justice Warren felt that both appellants had the
opportunity to raise their objections earlier,, and thus would deny relief, the majority,
although never specifically addressing itself to this point, implied that the OAIP had
acted in a timely fashion and thus was entitled to relief. Justice Black's opinion stresses
that at the district court hearing, the State of Ohio admitted that it could still print new
ballots before election day. Id. at 63-70.
The Chief Justice's opinion also assumes that the incidences of violation of the indi-
vidual's right to vote are the same in the Williams case as they were in the reapportion-
ment cases. See generally Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966), where
it is suggested that the courts should provide immediate relief when a state election
scheme completely deprives an individual of his vote rather than merely diluting the
weight of the vote. In appraising the question of whether a court should grant extra-
ordinary relief upon the infringement of a citizen's right to vote, the Court has balanced
the interest of the state against the effect of such an infringement on the individual's
right to vote. As the degree of the infringement increases, the more compelling it be-
comes for a Court to grant the extraordinary remedy demanded. A total denial of the
voting privilege, the most egregious type infringement of voting rights, would present
the most immediate need for extraordinary relief. Recognizing that the state has an
acknowledged interest in allowing minimal proportional representation among the state
electorate, it can be argued that the Williams situation, where the states has only a slight
interest, would demand more immediate relief than mere dilution of the relative weight
of an individual's vote.
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 892
tention that the expressed grant of power in article II section 1 pro-
vided state legislatures unencumbered discretion in the selection of
electors. While historically the Supreme Court eschewed passing
on cases involving political rights,1" a notable late 19th century ex-
ception suggested that the 14th and 15th amendments did con-
strain the state legislatures' article II section 1 power. In McPher-
son v. Blacker,20 the Court rejected a contention that the Michigan
legislature had effectively diluted the plaintiff's vote by conducting
an election for Presidential electors on a district level, rather than
on a state-wide basis. Without extended discussion, Justice Fuller
asserted that though "the appointment and mode of appointment of
electors belong exclusively to the States under the Constitution",
the Michigan law did not conflict with the 14th and 15th amend-
ments.21 Thus the Court's opinion in Williams affirms the historic
belief that conceptually the 14th amendment delimits the power
given to the states by article II section 1.
While the initial impact of the Williams case appears directed
toward its effect upon future Presidential elections, a more signifi-
cant implication is likely to be in what the decision portends for fu-
ture state and municipal elections.22  For two reasons it is doubt-
ful that the Court's opinion will inspire any modifications in the
19 See Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). In MacDougal v. Green, 335 U.S.
281 (1948), the constitutionality of the Illinois system of nominating candidates to
represent new political parties was upheld by the majority of the Court; however, Justices
Douglas and Black contended that the malapportioned election mechanism violated the
equal protection clause. The landmark case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
recognized that malapportionment was not beyond the jurisdiction of the Court and
finally ended the political question doctrine espoused in Colgrove. The most recent
examination of the constitutionality of a state election scheme involving post-election
procedure rather than ballot entrance requirements, also utilized the equal protection
rationale. See Fortson v. Mooris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
20 146 U.S. 1 (1892). The McPherson Court boldly answered the charge that it
should refrain from hearing the case since a political question was involved:
The question of the validity of this act ... is a judicial question and we
cannot decline the exercise of our jurisdiction upon the inadmissable sugges-
tion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judg-
ment of the highest tribunal of the state as revised by our own. Id. at 24.
As to the constitutional status of electors elected under article II section 1, see Ray v.
Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934); Hawke
v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); In re Green, 134 U.S. 377 (1890).
21 146 U.S. at 35. A close reading of Chief Justice Fuller's opinion indicates that
he believed the conduct of the Michigan legislature had to be scrutinized by the standards
set forth in the 14th and 15th amendments, but that in this instance, there had been no
violation.
22 The Chief Justice clearly indicated the full range of the majority's decision when
he said, "[t~he rationale of the opinion of this Court, based both on the equal protection
clause and the first amendment guarantee of freedom of association, will apply to all
elections, national, state, and local." 393 U.S. at 63 (dissenting opinion).
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states' Presidential election laws. First, the ballot access require-
ments of all other states for Presidential elections are less prohib-
itive than Ohio's. In striking down the statutory scheme both the
majority and concurring opinions stress that the Ohio law requiring
a new political party to obtain signatures of 15 percent of those
who had voted in the last gubernatorial election was particularly
unpalatable when compared with similar provisions in other states.
Only five other states would go so far as to require petitions signed
'by as many as 5 percent of the voters from the last preceding gen-
eral election, and in all such instances the filing date of the petition
is much closer to election day.23 Second, since both the form and
existence of the electoral college are presently in doubt,24 it is un-
likely that state legislatures will undertake even minor alterations
of present statutory schemes affecting Presidential elections. How-
ever, neither of these infirmities should -inhibit effective reform of
ballot access requirements as they pertain to state and municipal
candidacy.
Since the equal protection clause standard articulated by the
Court in Williams will apply to state and local election require-
ments, the decision prompts a reevaluation of such state laws in
light of the principles set forth in the opinion. Under current law
there is no established federal right entitling one to vote or to be a
candidate in a state or local election, but all states provide for both
privileges.2 5  While conceptually the right to vote and the right
2 3 See Id. at 47 n.9.
24 See Feerick, The Electorial College - Vhy it Ought to be Abolished, 37 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1 (1968); Rosenthal, Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections,
67 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1968); Spering, How To Make the Electoral College Constitu-
tionally Representative, 54 A.B.A.J. 763 (1968); Thorton, Analysis of Electoral College
Reform, 39 OKLA. B.A.J. 351 (1968). The official text of the proposed constitutional
amendment, providing for the direct election of the President, may not disturb the Wil-
liams holding, since section 4 states:
The times, places, and manner of holding such elections and entitlement
to inclusion on the ballot shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regula-
tions. The Congress shall prescribe by law, the time, place and manner in
which the results of such elections shall be ascertained and declared. (Ap-
proved by House Judiciary Committee, April 29, 1969). See N.Y. Times,
Apr. 30, 1969, at 21, col. 3 (city ed).
As long as Congress fails to act, the principle enunciated by Williams will apply to
limit the states' authority to condition access to the Presidential ballot. Moreover, if
Congress does exercise its power granted in section four of the proposed amendment,
it is likely that the due process clause of the fifth amendment will inhibit Congressional
discretion in much the same manner as the 14th amendment now confines the states' au-
thority to limit ballot access.
25 In Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944), the Court stated that "[the right
to become a candidate for state office, like the right to vote for the election of state of-
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to be a candidate appear distinct,2 6 the rationale of the Court in
Williams and in the reapportionment cases indicates that candidacy
is part of the right of a qualified voter to have his vote obtain
equal marginal impact along with other votes in a given election.
As expressed by Chief Justice Warren in Reynolds v. Sims:17 "The
right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is the essence
of a democratic society and any restrictions on that right strikes at
the heart of ,representative government." 8
Williams v. Rhodes indicates that a state's power to establish
'ballot access requirements for third-party candidates is more en-
cumbered than previously recognized, and that any such require-
ments must comport with the strictures embodied in the 14th
amendment. In the future when a given state election requirement
is challenged, a court will be compelled to evaluate the complete
election scheme, balancing the qualified voter's interest in having
his vote obtain equal marginal impact against the state's alleged
justification for inhibitions placed on ballot access. The Williams
Court acknowledged that the state has certain undefined interests
which may justify placing reasonable limits on the entry of a new
political party into the formal election process. Examination of
existing state statutes regulating access to the ballot in state and
local elections reveals a general pattern of similar restrictions
which may or may not be justified by state interests under the man-
date of Williams. However, before attempting to define the scope
of these legitimate state concerns, the pattern of state statutory reg-
ulation must be explored more fully.
Structurally, requirements for ballot access in state-wide elec-
tions differ from similar provisions regulating the selection of Pres-
ficers . . . is a right or privilege of state citizenship not of national citizenship which
alone is protected by the privileges and immunities clause." Id. at 7. The Court's ac-
tivity since Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), evidences an attempt to protect election
activity from discriminatory or arbitrary denial by the state of the right to vote and con-
sequently renders the language of Snowden suspect.
26 State courts have been vigilant in preserving the right of citizens to vote. See
Holliday v. O'Leary, 43 Mont. 157, 115 P. 204 (1911) (declaring violative of the
state constitution a state statute which allowed nomination only by petition containing
signatures equal to 5 percent of the total vote cast in the last general election); Rangan
v. Junkin, 85 Neb. 1, 122 N.W. 473 (1909) (statute requiring a specified number of
signatures for a nominating petition declared unconstitutional); Morris v. Minns, 224
S.W. 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). For two relatively recent cases which clearly articu-
late that the right to nominate and vote for the candidate of one's choice is a natural
collary of the right to vote see Lasseigne v. Martin, 202 So. 2d 250 (La. Ct. App. 1967);
Moore v. Walsh, 286 N.Y. 552, 37 N.E. 2d 555 (1941).
27377 U.S. 533 (1964).
281d. at 565; cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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idential electors. Generally, a place on the state's general election
ballot is automatically accorded to a political party as defined by
the respective state law. Lacking such designation, a political or-
ganization's most common alternative means for obtaining a posi-
tion on the ballot is the nominating petition. Forty-three states
allow candidates to qualify by direct nominating petition.29 Since
this procedure is often the exclusive method by which an independ-
ent candidate can gain a ballot position, conditions placed upon
the utilization of this device must be scrutinized. In general, there
are four conditions placed upon ballot access via the nominating
petition: a requirement as to the number of signatures; a require-
ment as to the apportionment of such signatures among counties
within the state; a requirement that the signatures be authentica-
ted; and a requirement that the petition be filed within a specified
period.
Forty-three states, theorizing that every prospective candidate
should be compelled to demonstrate some electorate support, re-
quire that the independent nominating petition be signed by a
specified number of voters, or a specified percentage of voters.30
29 See note 30 infra.
30 INDiEPENDENT NOMINATING PETITION SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS BY STATE
L No Independent Nominating Petition
Delaware
Florida
Louisiana
Michigan
New Mexico
Washington
II. States with Independent Nominating Petition Provisions Requiring Signa-
tures Based on Either a Certain Percentage of Votes or Voters at a Particular
Election, or Based on an Absolute Number of Signatures
A. States Requiring a Certain Percentage of: Percent
I. Registered Voters:
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1010(b) (Cum. Supp. 1968) 5
2. Votes Cast in the Last General Election:
CAL. ELE. CODE § 6831 (West 1961) 5
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-23 (1966) 1
3. Votes Cast in the Next General Election:
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 120.160(1) (1966) 1
4. Votes Cast in Last Election for.
a. Governor:
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-122(1) (Cum. Supp. 1967) 25
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-837 (Cum. Supp. 1967) 15
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-302(a) (Cum. Supp. 1968) 5
MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 53 § 6 (Cum. Supp. 1968) 3
S.D. CODE § 16.0501 (1939) 2
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-202 (1956) 2
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 429(5) (1949) 1
TM. ELEc CODE art 13.50 (1966) 1
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 572 (1959) 1
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Although Justice Black implies that requiring more than 1 percent
of the registered voters to sign a petition for a Presidential candi-
date would be unreasonable, a 3 percent requirement for state-wide
elections would hardly proscribe ballot access to any political
group. Applying such a standard, the laws of two states are
clearly unreasonable,"' while the requirements of five other states
are suspect. 32
In an attempt to abate sectional political movements, five states
require that either the petition signatures come from a designated
b. Secretary of State:
IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-3801 (1949) 0.5
c. Any Successful State-Wide Candidate:
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2911b (1963) 0.5
d. Successful Candidate for the Same Office:
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 23-804 (1967) 5
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-453 (1967) 0.5
e. Representative for Congress:
NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.200 (1967) 5
ORE. REV. STAT. § 294.740 (1968) 3
B. States Requiring An Absolute Number of Signatures: Number
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-2 (Smith-Hurd 1965) 25,000
N.D. CODE ANN. § 16-04-20 (Cum. Supp. 1967) 15,000
N.Y. ELEC. LAw § 138(5) (a) (McKinney 1965) 12,000
Miss. CODE ANN. § 32 6 0(a) (Cum. Supp. 1966) 10,000
S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.16 (Cum. Supp. 1968) 10,000
MD. CODE ANN. art. 33, § 67(b) (1967) 5,000
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 229 (1955) 5,000
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-612C (Cum. Supp. 1967) 3,000
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 8.20(4) (a) (1967) 3,000
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 202.09(a) (1962) 2,000
ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.160 (1962) 1,000
IOWA CODE ANN. § 45.1 (1949) 1,000
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.080(2) (Cum. Supp.
1968) 1,000
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-504(c) (1968) 1,000
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56-67 (1955) 1,000
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-15 (1964) 800
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-16-1 (Cum. Supp. 1967) 500
ALA. CODE tit. 17, 145 (1959) 300
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-7-1(3) (1964) 300
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-3-2(2) (Supp. 1969) 500
VA. CODE ANN. § 24-133 (1969) 250
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 22-118.11 (Cum. Supp. 1967) 100
HAWAII REv. LAws § 11-94 (Supp. 1965) 25
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-1206 (Cum. Supp. 1968) 25
31 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-837 (Cum. Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. 163-96
(Cum. Supp. 1967). None of the states with an expressed numerical requirement
would compel signatures from more than 5 percent of the registered voters of the re-
spective states.
3 2 See CAL. ELECT. CODE § 6831 (West 1961) (5 percent); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-
1010 (Cum. Supp. 1968) (5 percent): KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-302(a) (Cum. Supp.
1968) (5 percent); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 23-909 (1967) (3 percent); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 293.200 (1967) (5 percent).
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number of counties or that no more than a given number of signa-
tures be obtained from any one county.'s This requirement would
not inhibit a genuine state-wide third party;34 however, as the ur-
ban-rural population disparity grows more pronounced, such a
standard would restrict a cohesive metropolitan political effort to
establish political and thus fiscal independence.3 5
All states that allow nominating petitions require that the sig-
natures be authenticated. While most states require only that the
circulator of the petition believe the signatures to be of qualified
voters, three states demand that each signature be individually no-
tarized, 6 and three other states require that the circulator witness
all the petition signatures.3 7  The reasonableness of the latter re-
quirement is highly suspect, particularly when the signatures re-
quired number in the thousands.
3 3 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-612(c) (Cum. Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
46, § 10-3 (Smith-Hurd 1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 53, § 6 (1958); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 168.685 (1967); N.Y. ELEC. § 138 (McKinney 1964).
3 4 Using the number of votes cast in the 1968 Presidential election, the apportion-
ment requirements of these five states will, with one possible exception, probably not
cause extreme hardship. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-612 (Cum. Supp. 1967), demands
that 150 signatures come from each county; however, the smallest county, Camas, cast
only 482 votes in 1968. 1969 WORLD ALAMANAC 892 (1968). The requirement
that a fixed number of signatures be procured from each county becomes more onerous
as the size of the various counties in vote population decreases.
35 PERCENTAGE
OF SIGNATURES PORTION OF PERCENT
PERMITTED TOTAL STATE OF
APPORTIONMENT FROM ONE VOTE IN TOTAL
STATE REQUIREMENT* COUNTY* COUNTY 1968" * VOTE
Massachusetts No more than 1/3 33 1/3% Middle- 549,681 of 23%
from any one sex 2,306,691
county
Michigan 100 signatures 35 % Wayne 1,022,125 34%
from at least of 3,218,403
10 counties.
* For the statutes setting out the above requirements, see note 34 supra.
* 1969 WORLD ALMANAC 897 (Massachusetts), 898 (Michigan) (1968).
3 6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-7-1(4); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-3-2(g) (2)
(1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-133 (1964).
37 The North Carolina statute requires that 25 percent of votes cast in the preceding
gubernatorial election be witnessed personally by circulator. This requirement takes
on added significance in light of the 1,558,307 votes cast in North Carolina's 1968
gubernatorial election. 1969 WORLD ALMANAc. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-22 (1963).
Maryland requires 5,000 signatures be witnessed by the circulator. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 33, § 54 (1957). New Jersey is the least offensive by requiring that 2 percent
of those who voted in the last general election must sign the petition, and that the cir-
culator must wimess such signatures. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19: 1-1 (1962). Section
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Finally, in an attempt to provide ample time to print ballots
and to verify each candidate's credentials, state election laws re-
quire that the nominating petitions be filed before a particular
date. An independent candidate would prefer a late deadline in or-
der to capitalize on the interest generated by the collection of sig-
natures. Since it would appear that a July or August deadline for
a November election would accommodate both interests, the require-
ments of seven states demanding that petitions be filed before July
are of questionable validity."
Although the factual setting which precipitated the Williams
decision is unique, the principles contained in the opinion are of
particular significance from both a historical and contemporary
view point. The Williams Court categorically rejects the question-
able historical theory that the state legislative power to select Pres-
idential electors is unfettered by the 14th amendment. The signifi-
cance of the Court's approach is diminished somewhat by the fact
that only in this limited situation does the Constitution make an
express grant of power to the states of such magnitude, and, even
given the principle's application to such a circumstance, the elec-
toral college system itself is presently undergoing scrutiny. 9 How-
ever, the rationale of the Court is extremely significant in two
other aspects. Foremost, the limits recognized by the Court on -the
power of a government to restrict printed ballot access apply di-
rectly to state and municipal governments. Even recognizing that
the interest of a state government in overseeing a local election is
slightly different than the interests involved in overseeing a na-
tional election, an examination of the existing state requirements
for ballot access suggests that several of the present state systems
violate the edicts announced in Williams,4" Moreover, the Wil-
3501.38 (E) of the Ohio Revised Code provides that "[elvery petition paper shall bear
the affidavit of the circulator that he witnessed the affixing of every signature ...:"
(emphasis added). For a recent decision voiding signatures on a petition for noncom-
pliance with the statute, see State ex rel. Stillo v. Gwin, 18 Ohio St. 2d 66 (1969).
3 8AALA. CODE tir. 17, § 145(3) (Cum. Supp. 1968); ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.106
(1962); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-6 12(c) (Cum. Supp. 1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
25-302(a) (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-122(1) (Cum. Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 16-04-20(4) (Cum. Supp. 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-3-38 (1969).
3 9 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
40 Arkansas and North Carolina are highly questionable because of the large number
of signatures required. The requirement of Maryland and North Carolina, that the
circulator of the petition must witness every signature, is clearly suspect in light of the
large number of signatures required. Moreover, the requirement of the Michigan law
that no more than 35 percent of the required signatures come from any one county may
be ripe for challenging since Wayne County, the largest in the state, is approaching a
size equivalent to the 35 percent figure. Finally, several states require early filing dates;
